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Preference reversals, in which one alternative is preferred in a choice task while another
alternative is preferred in a judgment task, may occur in personnel selection. If so, the
candidate who is assigned the highest predictor score may not be the candidate the selector
would have chosen. Previous research does not clearly indicate the rate of preference
reversals that are likely to occur in personnel selection. A simulated selection task carried
out by 157 managers revealed near-zero levels of preference reversals. Implications for
decision theory and personnel selection research are discussed.
This research was carried out with support from the U.S. Army Research Institute, contract
SRFC #MDA903-87-K-OOOl. The views, opinions, and/or findings contained in this paper
are those of the author and should not be construed as an Official Department of the army
policy or decision.
This paper has not undergone formal review or approval of the faculty of the ILR School.
It is intended to make the results of Center research, conferences, and projects available to
others interested in human resource management in preliminary form to encourage
discussion and suggestions.
2PREFERENCE REVERSALS IN PERSONNEL SELECTION
The classical validation approach to evaluation of selection decisions, which involves
correlating predictor and criterion scores, has been criticized "to the extent that measurement
and prediction are stressed rather than the outcomes of decisions" (Cascio, 1991, p. 295). A
potentially important limitation of the classical validation approach may exist when the
selector is interested in identifying the single best candidate rather than assigning ratings to
each of the candidates. Behavioral decision theorists refer to the former task as "choice" and
to the latter task as "judgment" (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981).
Much existing selection research assumes that top-rated candidates will be the first to
be offered jobs by selectors (e.g. Murphy, 1986). However, preference reversals, in which one
alternative is preferred in a choice task while the other alternative is preferred in a judgment
task, have been well-documented (Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman, 1990). If preference
reversals plague personnel selection decisions, the shortcomings of the classical validation
approach may be severe. The candidate who is assigned the highest predictor score may not be
the candidate the selector would have chosen. If actual choices display a different preference
pattern from what would be inferred from the ratings, validity coefficients based on ratings may
inaccurately reflect the effectiveness of various selection devices for choosing the best job
candidate.
One group of preference reversal studies uses a matching design (Tversky, Sattath,
and Slovic, 1988). Two alternatives, A and B, are provided, with scores on two dimensions,
X and Y. XA > XB but YA < YB. In the choice task, one group of subjects is asked which
alternative they prefer, while in the judgment (matching) task, one number of the set
(XA, YA,XB, YB) is removed, and other groups of subjects calculate the value M of the
missing number that would equate the two alternatives. If alternative A is preferred in the
choice task, preference reversal occurs if M is greater than XA or YA, or less than XB or
YB.
3Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic (1988) apply this design to two personnel selection
simulations, each involving choice and matching of two candidates. 65 % of the subjects
involved in the choice task preferred one of the candidates, while 64 % of the matching
responses implied a preference for the other candidate. However, this matching task may be
too different from the actual judgment task of personnel selection to allow conclusions to be
drawn about the frequency of preference reversals in practice. The selection evaluation
process generally involves rating each candidate's overall attractiveness (Motowidlo, 1986;
Murphy, 1986), rather than deciding how much better an inferior candidate would have to
be on a single dimension to be equivalent to the superior candidate.
Most preference reversal studies involve choice and pricing of two gambles, one of
which offers a smaller chance to win a larger cash prize (Wedell and Bockenholdt, 1990).
Though preference reversals have been induced in such situations, Slovic, Griffin, and Tversky
(1990) cut the incidence of preference reversals from 41 % to 24% simply by using nonmonetary
prizes (i.e. free vacations, meals, and movie tickets) instead of cash prizes. This demonstrates
the compatibility effect, in which "a predictor [the amount of the cash prize, expressed in
dollars] will be weighted more heavily when it matches the response scale [the price of the
gamble, also expressed in dollars] than when it does not" (Slovic, Griffin, and Tversky, 1990,
p. 7). A typical personnel selection decision might involve determining which of two candidates
would receive higher performance ratings if hired, where one had stronger references and the
other had more relevant work experience. In this case, as in most selection decisions, predictors
and criteria are expressed in different units of measurement (Gatewood and Feild, 1990, pgs.
132-3), and the compatibility effect should have a smaller influence on personnel selection than
on gamble selection.
If personnel selection actually involves rating the overall attractiveness of candidates,
which is implied by the technique of correlating predictor and criterion scores to determine
the validity of selection devices (e.g. Schmitt and Klimoski, 1991), preference reversals may
4occur at near-zero levels. Slovic, Griffin, and Tversky (1990, p. 19) compared choice and
rating of pairs of delayed payoffs, and concluded that "no discrepancy between choice and
rating was observed... only 11% of the patterns exhibited preference reversal between choice
and rating as compared to 52 % between choice and pricing."
Thus, previous research does not clearly indicate what level of preference reversals
occur in personnel selection. While a simulated personnel selection yielded high levels of
preference reversals, the matching task employed in the experiment was somewhat different
from the usual judgment task of personnel selection. An experiment in which the judgment
task consisted of assigning ratings to each alternative resulted in low levels of preference
reversals. Since preference reversals could sometimes lead to misinterpretations of personnel
selection validity using the classical validation approach, it is important to make further
investigations into their prevalence. The purpose of this study is to estimate the extent of
preference reversals using actual managers as subjects and a more realistic simulation of the
selection task.
Method
A simulated selection task was devised, in which selectors evaluated eight candidates
for promotion to the position of Accounting Supervisor. Half of the subjects were told to
assign promotability scores to each candidate Qudgment task) while the other half were told
to choose which candidate to promote (choice task). In a previous paper, the authors
examined differences in information acquisition between subjects engaged in each task
(Rudin and Boudreau, 1989).
The candidates were represented by written descriptions of interpersonal skills and
computer competence. These dimensions are similar to the factors of "technical
knowledge" and "human relations" used by Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic (1988) in one of
their simulations of personnel selection decisions.
5Interpersonal skills descriptors were adapted from the Akron Leadership Questionnaire
(Lord, Foti, and de Vader, 1984), which provides well-validated trait descriptions of good,
moderate, and poor leadership. Verbal protocol analyses of several subjects participating in
pretests indicated that subjects were able to correctly distinguish the intended quality differences
implied by the descriptors of both dimensions.
The set of eight candidates contained all possible combinations of high, moderate,
and low favorability on the two dimensions, except high computer competence and high
interpersonal skills. The exclusion of such a candidate created a conflict set of two
potentially" superior" choices (the candidates with positive descriptors on one dimension and
moderate descriptors on the other dimension.) For reasons discussed above, we believed that
Slovic, Griffin, and Tversky's (1990) study of choice and rating, which found few
preference reversals, had more elements in common with actual personnel selection decisions
than Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic's (1988) study of choice and matching, which found many
preference reversals. It was hypothesized, therefore, that preference reversals would not
occur, and that preference patterns would be similar in the rating and choice tasks.
The exercise was distributed to managers of three large firms and a large
university. Exercises were accompanied by a cover letter, signed by an executive
associated with the subjects' employers.
Results
Of the 230 exercises that were distributed, 157 were returned, a response rate of
68 %. 80 subjects completed the choice task, while 77 completed the judgment task. As
Table One indicates, 77 of the 80 choosers and 67 of the 77 judgers preferred the same
candidate. Even if we make the highly unlikely assumption that all 13 subjects who failed to
indicate a clear preference for the "high interpersonal skills - moderate computer
competence" candidate would have reversed their preferences had they completed the other
task, this would indicate a preference reversal rate of only 8%, which is lower than the
Candidate Task
Computer Competence Interpersonal Skills Choice Judgment
Medium High 77 67
High Medium 1 7
Low High 1 0
Medium Medium 1 0
6
lowest preference reversal rates previously attained in experiments (Slovic, Griffin, and
Tversky, 1990). Therefore, our hypothesis that preference reversals would not generally
occur in a simulated selection task was strongly confirmed.
Table One
Number of subjects indicating a clear preference for each candidate, by task.
Note: Three subjects engaged in the judgment task assigned tie scores to their two
preferred candidates, thereby failing to indicate a clear preference for one candidate.
Discussion
The preference reversal phenomenon may have important implications for strategic
decision makers contemplating risky and uncertain proposals, but it may not affect personnel
selection. The nature of the judgment task (rating overall attractiveness) and the
incompatibility of stimulus and response appear to have reduced the incidence of preference
reversals to near-zero levels in our experiment. We would expect these results to generalize
to other common selection decisions such as selections of prize winners for merit-based
competitions. A better understanding of the conditions under which preference reversals are
most likely to occur can enhance the usefulness of preference reversal research to decision
makers.
7Although this study failed to uncover evidence of preference reversals, the distinction
between judgment and choice in personnel selection is nonetheless important. Many selection
decisions, such as internal promotions to highly desirable positions, involve only one
vacancy and little chance of refusal by the preferred candidate, and are thus more similar to
choice tasks than to judgment tasks. There is no legal imperative in the United States to
assign ratings to each candidate, as shown by the case of EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
(1986), won by the defendant despite severe adverse impact and lack of a consistent system
for evaluating candidates.
If the preference patterns elicited by judgment and choice processes are the same for
personnel selection, as this study suggests, then it may not be necessary for ratings to be made
of all candidates when the selector is only interested in choosing the best candidate. A strategy
of rating every candidate and choosing the one with the highest rating requires much more
information processing than any other choice method and may not be justifiable from a
cost-benefit standpoint (Johnson and Payne, 1985). Future research is needed to delineate the
conditions under which selectors may dispense with the task of rating each candidate, focussing
instead on their true interest of choosing the best candidate.
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